Abstract
A central explanation for domestic audience costs is that the public fears the international repercussions of its leaders’ empty threats. But how do international audiences actually react to such behavior? We examine this question focusing on “security-dependent” allies, whose security relies on a great-power protector. First, we argue that these allied audiences, like domestic audiences, are less favorable toward patron-state leaders who fail to follow through on threats. Second, because many allied citizens prefer deterrence against shared adversaries, they may reward the patron-state leaders for adopting a belligerent posture. Finally, this “belligerence benefit,” which contrasts with patterns in domestic audiences, is larger among those concerned about abandonment, external threats, and moral obligation. We provide empirical support for these expectations with a survey experiment in Japan. Our findings reveal a distinctive logic of foreign reactions to empty threats: security-dependent publics respond negatively to failed follow-through but may reward threats that signal shared goals.
Citation
Xu, Weifang, Yusaku Horiuchi, and Kelly Matush. n.d. “Security Dependence and Public Opinion in Crises: Inconsistency Costs and Belligerence Benefits.” Working paper. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6414559